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Trust matters: a cross-cultural
comparison of Northern Ghana and
Oaxaca groups
Cristina Acedo-Carmona* and Antoni Gomila
Evocog Group, Associated Unit to IFISC (UIB-CSIC), Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de
Mallorca, Spain
A cross-cultural analysis of trust and cooperation networks in Northern Ghana (NGHA)
and Oaxaca (OAX) was carried out by means of ego networks and interviews. These
regions were chosen because both are inhabited by several ethnic groups, thus providing
a good opportunity to test the cultural group selection hypothesis. Against the predictions
of this approach, we found that in both regions cooperation is grounded in personal
trust groups, and that social cohesion depends on these emotional bonds. Moreover,
in agreement with Fiske’s notion of “evolved proclivities,” we also found two distinct
kinds of trust networks, one for each region, which vary in terms of the degree of ethnic
interrelation. This pattern suggests that social cohesion increases when environmental
resources are scarce.
Keywords: trust, cooperation, social network, human evolution, ethnic group, cross-cultural analysis
Introduction
Multiple agent-based models of the evolution of human sociality have tried to pin down the
reasons why cooperation is biologically advantageous –kin selection (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971;
Dawkins, 1976), group selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Wilson and Sober, 1994; Bergstrom,
2002), direct or indirect reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984; Caporael et al., 1989). Other
models have focused on the human inclination to punish selfish behavior –strong altruism (Boyd
et al., 2003, 2010; Gintis et al., 2003, 2008; Bowles and Gintis, 2004). To test some of the previous
hypotheses, authors have used methods such as game theory (Henrich et al., 2004, 2006; Hoffman
et al., 2007; Marlowe et al., 2008; Ermisch et al., 2009; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Dal Bó and
Fréchette, 2011). However, even when some of the previous studies use cross-cultural data, they
need further anthropological evidence, in order to find out whether their assumptions hold in fact.
Similarly, in this paper we want to contribute to test a particularly influential recent version of
group selection theory: the cultural group selection hypothesis (CGS) (Boyd and Richerson, 2009;
Richerson et al., 2015). This model explains the emergence of human sociality in terms of a shared
culture which guarantees group cohesion and cooperation, so that groups which lack this kind of
social cement are overcome, or assimilated by those that do. In other words, the groups with more
effective cultures will get greater internal cooperation and will be evolutionarily selected. From
CGS follows: (1) that members of a group should cooperate equally with any member of the same
cultural group, beyond kin, and (2) it predicts regional cultural homogenization in the long run: if
there is competition among co-local cultural groups, the most successful one is deemed to prevail
Abbreviations: OAX, Oaxaca; NGHA, Northern Ghana.
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according to CGS, either by exclusion of the other or by
absorption/assimilation (by imitation of the most successful one,
for instance).
In contrast to this explanation, we contend that cooperation
beyond kin is made possible by the creation of small groups
united by ties of personal trust (Acedo-Carmona and Gomila,
2014a,b, in press). Although trust has received a lot of attention,
personal trust has not been included in evolutionary models of
cooperation, basically because evolutionary game-theory takes
anonymous playing as a central assumption (Acedo-Carmona
and Gomila, 2013). Many studies, though, have developed
ways to measure trust (Yamagishi, 1998; Glaeser et al., 2000;
Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Naef and Schupp, 2009; Wang
and Gordon, 2011), despite the difficulty of this challenge,
given the complexity and diversity of the elements involved. In
addition, such measurements have been focused mostly on the
notion of general trust (Yamagishi, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner,
2002) –the attitude toward any unknown individual– than on
personal trust –which arises from previous positive experiences
with known individuals, and involves an affective binding and
a mutual expectation of reciprocation (Acedo-Carmona and
Gomila, 2012). In previous research using economic games,
we have demonstrated that personal trust is the factor that
brings cooperation to a maximum (Acedo-Carmona and Gomila,
2013, 2014a). Personal trust consists in a feeling of security, the
expectation that positive behaviors will come from the members
of one’s trust circle. This psychological mechanism unconsciously
guarantees a pro-social behavior toward the trusted persons.
In parallel, several researchers have tried to understand the
constraints that modulate this basic social structure, so that
its concrete manifestation in a particular society may vary
depending on the relevant forces involved, as suggested by
the notion of “evolved proclivities” (Fiske, 2000): while trust
networks can be universal, their particular instantiation in each
society may vary according to the adaptive challenges involved.
Research by Zhou et al. (2005), Stiller and Dunbar (2007) and
Roberts et al. (2009), for instance, show that the number of
people that can be included in the closest circles has to be small
because of cognitive and time limitations, so that differences
can be expected if these limitations are not universal. But other
constraints can be imagined, as for instance, scarcity of resources.
In dire straits, group support seems to be clearly an advantage
-and maybe the only way to manage to survive. There is a
long tradition of anthropological studies that relate behavioral
ecology and culture (White, 1943; Steward, 1955; Harris, 1966;
Rappaport, 1979). However, it remains to be shown that the
ecological environment may play a role in the configuration of
networks of cooperation and, above all, trust.
To address all the above questions, a cross-cultural approach
turns out to be mandatory. We decided to compare two
different regions, Northern Ghana (NGHA) and the Oaxaca
region (OAX), both inhabited by several ethnic groups. Previous
research on Ghana (Adams and Plaut, 2003; Adams, 2005)
focused on the way social relations are understood, suggesting
that a stringent notion of trust is at play, connected to
dependability rather than intimacy. For our purposes, we have
been more interested in checking social practices than asking
about cultural conceptions, but the results are convergent.
The cross-cultural comparison of the NGHA-OAX trust-based
networks of cooperation, presented in this work, provides
relevant evidence to test the following hypotheses:
(i) Cooperation is structured around social networks of
personal trust -not homogeneously within a cultural
group; thus, we expect to find that personal trust fosters
cooperation in both settings, so that cooperation is not
homogeneously distributed within each cultural group. In
fact, intergroup cooperation is possible when intergroup
trust is found.
(ii) Cultural differentiation (distinct ethnic and linguistic
groups in both cases) contributes to strengthening internal
bonds; its persistence calls into question the second
prediction of CGS, that cultural homogenization is to be
expected.
(iii) The psychology of trust is adapted to the needs of the
environment: in the most difficult environments, where
individuals need more help, more cohesive networks will
emerge, that can cross the group boundaries.
Before getting into the details of the study, we provide next
some background of the cultural, social, economic, political and
historical contexts that underlie these groups, in order to better
understand their respective social lives.
Regions and Groups Studied in Context
Regions and Groups
Oaxaca (México)
Oaxaca is one of the 32 federal entities that form México. It
is located in the South of the country, in the southwest of
the Tehuantepec Isthmus. It is distributed in 8 regions, which
comprise 30 districts (Figure 1). The places and ethnic groups
visited for the study were:
• Mixtec region (area Northwest of Oaxaca): Mixtecs (Spores,
2008; Joyce, 2010) from Yolotepec de la Paz, Tlaxiaco district,
with a population of 151 inhabitants.
• Central Valleys region: Mestizos (Chance, 1979) from Oaxaca
de Juarez, Center district, with a population of 255,029
inhabitants; and Zapotecs (Zeithin, 1990; Joyce, 2010) from
Teotitlán del Valle, Tlacolula district, with 4,357 inhabitants.
• Isthmus region: Chontales (Oseguera, 2004) of several towns
in the District of Tehuantepec, situated both in the highland
areas –colonia Marilú, with 411 inhabitants, and San
Miguel Ecatepec, with 677 inhabitants, both in Magdalena
Tequisistlán, and San Miguel Tenango, with 552 inhabitants–,
and in the coastal areas –San Pedro Huamelula, with 2,100
inhabitants and Santiago Astata, with 3,642 inhabitants–;
Zapotecs (Zeithin, 1990; Campbell, 1993) from Juchitán
de Zaragoza, with 74,825 inhabitants, and Zoques (Trejo
Barrientos, 2006) from San Miguel Chimalapa, with 135
inhabitants, both of them in Juchitán district.
Such diversity of ethnic groups is accompanied by the same
diversity of languages or dialects. The participants’ languages,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 661
Acedo-Carmona and Gomila Trust comparison: Northern Ghana-Oaxaca
FIGURE 1 | Situation of Oaxaca, its regions and districts, and the visited locations –red and blue points. (http://revistatzacualli.blogspot.com.es/. Modified
by Cristina Acedo).
in addition to Spanish language, comes from different families
of languages: Otomanguean languages (the Zapotec language in
different dialects: the main Zapotec in Tequisistlán Valley and the
Tehuantepecan Zapotec in Juchitán; and the Mixtec language),
Toto-zoquean languages (Mixes languages and the Chimalapas
Zoques languages), and the Hokan languages from southern
area (Chontal language from Oaxaca, also called Tequistlatecs –
highland and coastal dialects).
Northern Ghana
Ghana has 10 administrative regions, including the regions in
the north and the upper-east (Figure 2) where the study was
conducted. The places and ethnic groups visited for the study
were:
• Upper-East region: fieldwork was carried out in the city
of Bawku (district of Bawku, 56,830 inhabitants) and the
city of Garu (Garu-Tempane district, 20,802 inhabitants). In
the former, we had access to Kussasis (Syme, 1932; Hilton,
1962; Awedoba, 1989, 2001), Frafras (Hart, 1971), Bissas and
Mossis (Zahan, 1967), and members of groups original from
other regions of the country such as the Ashanti (Rattray,
1931, 1932), and Sissalas and Waalas (Wilks, 1989); all of
them inhabit the city of Bawku, in the Bawku Municipal
district, with 56,830 inhabitants. In Garu, some Kussasis also
participated.
• Northern region: Mamprusis (Drucker-Brown, 1975,
1992; Schlottner, 2000), Bimobas (Fussy, 1979; Laari,
1987; Assimeng, 1990), Konkombas (Tait, 1961), and
Fulanis (Oppong, 2002; Tonah, 2005), all of them from
Bende, Bunkpurugu-Yunguo district (approximately 5,875
inhabitants).
Participants from Bawku live in an urban environment, and
participants from Bende and Garu live in rural areas.
The different languages of all these ethnic groups are part
of the set of Nigerien-Congolese languages: the languages
Kwa (Ashantis), Gur (Bimobas, Mamprusis, Mossis, Kussasis,
Sissalas, Walas, Frafras, Konkombas), Mande (Bissas), and Fulbe
(Fulanis). However, each of these branches has resulted in
different languages and dialects for each of these groups.
Historical and Cultural Contexts
Both areas have a wide diversity of ethnic groups. However, the
circumstances in which such multiple groups have emerged and
the levels of interaction among groups are different. In both
zones, the different cultural groups have coexisted for a long
time, but a sense of their own identity has been maintained,
despite interacting or sharing a common history. In order to
better understand this issue, below, there is a brief review of
the historical context in which both social and cultural network
structures were created.
Oaxaca
The settlements in the current region of Oaxaca followed
different stages: agricultural settlements (9000–1500 B.C),
“villages” (1500–500 B.C.), urban settlements (500 B.C.–800
A.D.), and “city-states” (750–1521 A.D.). These concentrations
were constituted by the union of family lineages (Bandelier,
1982). They grew until the appearance of cities and “cultural
civilizations.” Examples of this are the large concentrations
of Olmec, Zapotec and Mixtec people in the Middle Pre-
classic period (1200–400 B.C.). These City-States became more
complex and extended to other areas. They created hierarchical
figures who managed different aspects of group life: a maximum
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FIGURE 2 | Situation of Ghana, its districts and the visited areas. (http://iah241e.wikispaces.com/Ghana) (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Regions_
of_Ghana_en.svg) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Upper_East_Ghana_districts.png. Modified by Cristina Acedo).
governor, advisers, officials (judges and guardians), army heads,
province governors, and tax collectors. Therefore, they were
societies organized by strict normative regulations.
Although these cities influenced each other, they maintained
their own identity, cultural traits, and management. The Mixtec
people, for example, were organized into independent Lordships.
The same happened with alliances between cities such as
Teotihuacan, Monte Alban (Zapotec city), and Tikal (Mayan
city) during the Early Classic period (200–600 A.D.), and with
the Toltec people in the Late Classic period (600–900 A.D.)
and the Early Post-classic period (800/900–1100 A.D.). In the
Late Post-classic period (1100–1521/1694 A.D.) a period of wars
began, in which some groups invaded others’ territory, such as
the Mixtec people who forced the Zapotec people toward the
Isthmus regions, and the Aztecs –the Mexica people– who were
moving toward Oaxaca and Yucatán from the North. However,
the Aztecs allowed self-management in the conquered territories
in exchange for receiving tributes.
This same autonomy in the management of their own affairs
was maintained during the Spanish colonization. Despite the
exploitation of indigenous people and the inclusion of new taxes
that squeezed their resources, the Spanish Crown in many cases
allowed the Indians to keep their self-management, through
the communal possession of territory (Reina Aoyama, 2004).
The settlers were more interested in the profit from local
resources by the intermediation of the noble elite –“caciques”–
collecting taxes, than in intervening directly in the management
of resources. The colonization pressure positively influenced the
revival of ethnic communities because it was a way for the
indigenous people to join the community efforts in order to
survive and deal with the settlers’ pressures.
Throughout the colonial period and the independence of
the Republic of Mexico, governors progressively pursued a
cultural homogenization, trying to privatize lands and creating
municipalities to gain the greatest possible control over resources
and people (Nahmad Sitton, 2011). However, far from gaining
control over the indigenous people, these policies helped to
reaffirm their cultural differentiation and the communal fight
to maintain the “usos y costumbres” (indigenous customary law)
system –their self-management–, that guaranteed participation
of the community members in community decisions, including
the communal possession of land. In this way, territory,
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community, and cultural identity merged into the same
goal of individuals’ subsistence against their exploitation and
marginalization by the powerful elite –first, the Spanish nobles,
and later, the Creoles and wealthy Mestizos. Not in vain, the
inherited Mesoamerican beliefs already largely linked group
identity to a specific territory (Barabas, 2006, 2008).
In sum, these groups –at first, the pre-Hispanic groups
maintaining their cultural specificities in spite of their mutual
influence, subsequently, in the Colonial and Republic periods,
reaffirming identity as groups of indigenous people, and finally,
with communal self-management in municipalities– became the
current ethnic groups (Reina Aoyama, 2004). In the case of
Oaxaca, these municipalities were also physically separated due
to the mountainous nature of these regions and the great climatic
diversity. All these elements contributed to the great ethnic
diversity that currently appears in the Oaxaca region, where there
is a large number of small municipalities with their own cultural
specificities regarding clothing, customs, dances, festivals and
dialects, despite that also they have common cultural elements
due to their long shared history.
Ghana
The origin of the ethnic groups in Ghana and their history are not
very clear (Southall, 1970; Schildkrout, 1979; Ranger, 1983, 1993;
Lentz, 2000). The members of these groups belong to different
lineages which at some point coalesced, giving rise to clans. In
northern Ghana, in addition to the settlements of acephalous
groups of indigenous people, other tribes from other areas also
settled.
The North of Africa has had a long history of nomadic tribes
moving across the continent and a long tradition of movement
of traders. Sub-Saharan migrations due to the trade of gold and
salt, and the slave trade caused frequent movements of different
groups in the area.
Akan people seem to have migrated from western Africa
between the 10th and 12th centuries to the wooded areas of
contemporary Ghana and they established small states in the
mountain regions. Already in the 10th century, southern Ghana
was part of the Asante Empire. These groups were also small
“city-states” that, over the centuries, united to form an empire
in the 18th century.
In the north of Ghana, it seems that the Mole-Dagbane
Kingdoms (Mamprusi, Dagomba and Mossi people) settled
between the 13th and 15th centuries, coming from north-east
African areas, which dominated the acephalous people installed
there. The Kussasi, Frafra, and Sissala people, who also inhabit
some areas of northern Ghana, came from west of Sudan and
migrated to the area in the 17th century, although other Sissala
people seem to be descendants of the Mole-Dagbane groups. The
Fulani people came from Niger and Senegal in the 16th century
but they migrated to northern Ghana practically at the beginning
of the 20th century. The Bissa or Busanga people settled in
the White Volta in the 14th century. The Bimoba people are a
mixture of the Moba people, who migrated from Burkina Faso
in the 17th century, and the Mamprusi and Konkomba people,
after being driven to the north by the Mamprusi and Dagomba
people. Regarding the Konkomba people, it seems that they are
some of the few original groups of these lands. TheWaala people,
from the city of Wa, capital of the upper-west region, arose from
the conjunction in the 17th century of the warrior traditions
of the Dagomba and Mamprusi people and Islamic traditions
transmitted through small groups of Mande immigrants from
Niger. Both the Mamprusi and the Mossi people in the north
and the Asante people in the center of Ghana were centralized
and hierarchical groups that gainedmore power, compared to the
other mentioned groups, which were acephalous. In these cases,
however, the more powerful groups were assimilating the social
forms of the groups that were mixed with (Rattray, 1932). There
are controversies among authors about these historical data.
In short, all of these groups are the result of the creation of
different lineages that were forming their own cultural traits over
time. The dynamics of separation and union to form new lineages
with their own cultural traits have been continuous. Cultural
diversity is observed in their different languages and dialects,
beliefs, customs, festivals, etc.; differences either actually based on
history or on a common imaginary.
In the 15th century, the Portuguese people exploited the
mineral resources of this country and subsequently, the British,
French and Dutch people arrived (in the 16th century).
In the 17th century, the Asante Confederation unified the
groups. Solidarity among groups was appropriate because of
the competition to acquire farmlands, control trade routes,
and protect each other. In 1901, the areas of northern Ghana
became an English Protectorate. The existing rivalries among
certain ethnic groups because of fights for territory or slave
trade increased with the English colonization, which promoted
inequality of power among them and granted certain social
and economic courtesies to some ethnic groups in detriment
to others. In 1957, the country became independent but the
differences before and during the colonial period are the origin
of the current inter-ethnic tensions and the cultural reaffirmation
of groups.
There are, in this case, groups that also have influenced each
other at a cultural level, but the survival pressures and their
different allocation of power regarding others have led them to
strengthen their ethnic identity.
Economic Context
The resources and economic development of the two countries
are also different. Whereas in OAX, the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita by purchasing power parity (PPP) –GDP per
capita converted to international dollars using PPP rates–was
$16,463 in 2013, in NGHA, it was $3974 (World Bank data).
Whereas OAX is one of the poorest regions ofMexico, it is in a
better position than NGHA, because of the productive resources
of its environment and its level of economic development.
In OAX, people live mainly from agriculture, as well as
tourism, the services sector, crafts, fishing, salt in some coastal
areas of the Isthmus region, and recently, wind energy. The
climatic diversity in OAX allows cultivation of a wide range
of products such as cane sugar, lemon, orange, alfalfa, barley,
corn, avocado, pineapple, rice, melon, watermelon, agave, coffee
and tobacco. In general, the landscape of OAX offers abundant
vegetation and the rains per year are 1550mm.
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Ghana, however, is in the lower middle income countries of
the world, with a 24.2% of the population under the threshold
of poverty, according to World Bank data for 2012 (http://data.
worldbank.org/country/ghana). Its economy has grown, mainly
due to improvements in agriculture, the development of the
extractive industries, the natural resources of the country (oil, gas,
and minerals), the services sector, and manufacturing. However,
the north of the country, where we conducted the study, is the
poorest region, dominated by the Savannah with large areas of
grasses, baobabs, and acacia trees. These arid areas −1.015mm
of rain per year– are used mostly for slash-and-burn farming and
livestock. Also, the effects of the Harmattan, a dry wind from the
wilderness, which reduces moisture and increases the number of
hot days, last about 4 months of the year. Due to the previously
mentioned, conflicts because of farmland distribution and the
rudimentary and small-scale farming techniques, the inhabitants
only have a subsistence economy.
Social and Political Structures
Both in OAX and NGHA, relatives play an important social role.
However, there are some differences between these countries in
the relatives’ networks and also in other social structures.
Oaxaca
In OAX, the nuclear family –parents and children– is the
most widespread form of cohabitation. Sometimes, grandparents
or other solitary members of the family can be part of the
household, but normally children change their place of residence
when they get married. In many cases, the ties between siblings
become weaker, especially because of their different place of
residence. Other social groups are those arising from the bonds
created in the educational, work, and neighborhood contexts in
which individuals move, characteristic of societies with a greater
number of inhabitants and more complex social organizations.
However, the sense of community is deeply rooted among
these groups. Both in urban areas –“colonias”– as in the rural
area –“municipality”–, people create a sense of community. The
community plays a role in the self-management of common
affairs (MaldonadoAlvarado, 2013). The community is organized
through periodic assemblies which all adult members can and
must attend–women are increasingly being more accepted in
these meetings. The community is also managed through some
public service obligations –“tequios”– that are required of its
members. In the cities, such communities are constituted around
the occupied territory, which allows the coexistence of people
settled from other municipalities –different cultural traits–, with
Mestizos.
However, in rural areas, the municipality –administratively
established territory– becomes a core of cultural identity,
especially as a result of the Spanish colonization and subsequent
policies carried out by the Republic of Mexico. The inhabitants
of such municipalities are part of different cultural groups, who
have maintained certain cultural traits over time and, on other
occasions, have developed cultural variations –different dialects,
clothing, costumes or dances with certain modifications, etc.–
in order to acquire specific hallmarks. The internal community
administration regulated by “usos y costumbres” has allowed
them some kind of self-management. This form of community
self-management implies the direct involvement of the whole
community, again in periodic assemblies, to decide on common
issues. Also, the communal administration of farmlands has
given rise to a system of distribution and appropriation of
land for its exploitation, while the property remains communal.
However, the current gradual inclusion of political parties in
municipalities is threatening both the “usos y costumbres” system
and the communal distribution of land.
All of these forms of self-management and community
membership –urban or rural– are accompanied by the implicit
normative communal sense that forces its members to comply
with their “tequios” –community services–, which have a strong
tradition. Failure to comply with the mandatory services has
negative consequences for the individuals who omit their
duties. Therefore, group cohesion has a great normative and
authoritative basis. The “tequio” has a more extended sense
than helping others in order to obtain some future aid if
necessary. This sense of required reciprocity is very internalized
in individuals, but again, in an unconscious normative sense.
Ghana
In NGHA, the extended family still cohabits to a greater extent
than in OAX and, in many cases, the family in NGHA includes
a greater number of people, as shown in the language, using
the same term for different relatives. In addition, in NGHA,
the closest relatives follow lineages –matrilineal or patrilineal–
and clans, which are cultural ways that gain importance in how
society and economy are structured.
In NGHA, monogamy or polygamy are both allowed,
depending on own religion. Polygamy occurs very frequently.
Relatives that cohabite are generally the extended family,
especially in rural areas. The family is composed of the husband
and several wives, and the rest of the lineage members –
matrilineal or patrilineal– depending on the ethnic group, so that
the domestic group may consist of up to 50 people. The most
of the ethnic groups in NGHA are patrilineal; only the Akan
groups have matrilineal lineages. In urban areas, the relatives’
cohabitation tends to be made up of a smaller number of people.
These social structures are also strongly linked to economic
aspects, as properties and titles are distributed by lineage, group
membership implies group support, and the signs of identity
establish the rules for partnerships and marriages. Also the
household head –landlord– can decide about the transfer of
exploitation rights on the lands the community gives to him, as
well as on the management and allocation of tasks among the
family members.
The concept of clan usually refers to a group united by ties of
kinship or by a common ancestor. In the case of Ghana, the clan
can also have a territorial sense and can refer to a lineage, a set of
lineages, or groups that occupy a common territory.
Apart from the family and clan, there are other social
structures such as the “community” –a group of individuals that
resides in a common territory–, that may constitute a clan or
several clans; the “heads of clan or lineage” –group of elders– who
decide internal clan or lineage issues; the “priests of the Earth” –
religious authorities–; and “the chiefs” –who manage the judicial
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affairs and are mediators in matters with the Government. The
“community” assigns the farmlands (Agbosu et al., 2007), and
the “heads of clan or lineage” and the “priests of the land”
manage communal resources –such as water, hunting, fishing, use
of forests, etc.– and oversee rule compliance on such resources
(Kotey, 1995).
There are conflicts among some ethnic groups due to the
acquisition of administrative power, land rights and historic
conflicts among certain ethnic groups that tried to impose
their rule on others. The British colonial Government gave
greater power to some groups, especially those who already
possessed a more hierarchical social structure and power before
the colonization, but currently, the groups that were historically
acephalous are trying to claim their space of power (Manboah-
Rockson, 2004). All of these reasons strengthened ethnic identity.
However, in this case, the groups are linked by a sense of
identity and belonging attached to the concepts of lineage and
clan, different from the normative cohesion of the OAX groups.
Although in both areas, there are some elements in common
with respect to the existence of communal ownership of land
and ethnic reaffirmation as a way of protection, in NGHA, there
is much more interaction between ethnic groups, despite the
history of conflicts between some of them. In NGHA, marriages
between people coming from different ethnic groups can often
be seen. However, in OAX, the different ethnic groups have less
contact with each other.
Methods
Procedures
Two methods have been used: personal networks of usual
cooperators –ego networks–, and interviews. Participants in
NGHA were interviewed in English, if possible; if not, they were
interviewed in their own language with the help of an interpreter.
In OAX, all participants were speakers of Spanish.
Ego Networks
Ego networks refer to the personal networks of cooperation.
In order to obtain them, participants were asked to list the
names of people with whom they usually cooperate. They
are also asked for the cooperators’ ethnic groups, type of
relationship between ego and cooperators, type of cooperation
they maintain, whether the cooperative relationship is one-sided
or mutual (reciprocity), and the trust level they maintain toward
cooperators. In Supplementary Materials are presented the forms
for the OAX and NGHA groups (Supplementary materials 1, 2).
Interviews
Participants were interviewed about trust and cooperation. The
interview consisted of 21 questions –Supplementary Material
3 for OAX and 4 for NGHA. The questions focused on the
factors involved in the creation, maintenance, and breakdown
of trust, seeking the factors that might be universal and those
that might be culture-related: questions on what they took into
account when deciding to trust someone for the first time;
who they trusted more and who were their trustees for secrets;
whether it was possible to always trust the family, their meaning
of family and their family relationships; the exchanges that
required higher levels of trust; what type of situations they
considered as a betrayal of trust, whether they would be able
to forget such a circumstance, and how they would punish it;
their relationships within the same clan; whether they trusted
other ethnic groups and their relationships with them; activities
carried out in the community to promote trust and integrate
new members; importance of reputation in community; the
influence of religion or the Government on the attitudes of
trust and cooperation toward other individuals; and the level of
respondents’ feeling of safety, and their values as a group. Among
the list of questions, those referring to known trustees concern
personal trust, but other questions refer to general trust –such
as trusting other ethnic groups in general, or the influence of
religion or Government authorities in assuring cooperation, for
example.
In order to facilitate the comparison of NGHA and OAX,
we chose social practices rather than conceptions. In addition,
we tried to adjust as much as possible the equivalence of
concepts in translations. Conceptual differences are revealed
by the differences in social practices, but we avoid comparing
conceptions as such. We also avoided categorizing responses at
more abstract clusters. Responses were alwaysmutually exclusive.
Participants
All participants gave informed consent, following the ethics
protocol approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of
the Balearic Islands.
Ego Networks
InOAX, 66 persons participated: 34males (51.5%) and 32 females
(48.5%). The participants’ ethnic groups are: 15 Chontales
(22.7%), 10 Mestizos (15.2%), 1 Mixe (1.5%), 1 Mixtec (1.5%), 17
Zapotecs from Juchitán (25.8%), 12 Zapotecs from Teotitlán del
Valle (18.2%) and 10 Zoques (15.2%). The distribution of these
ethnic groups by gender is shown in Figure 3.
In NGHA, 46 persons participated: 33 males (71.7%) and 13
females (28.3%). The participants’ ethnic groups are: 9 Bimobas
(19.6%), 1 Frafra (2.2%), 9 Konkombas (19.5%), 11 Kussasis
(23.9%), and 16 Mamprusis (34.8%). The distribution of these
ethnic groups by gender is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of participants by ethnic groups in the method
of ego networks of cooperation. M means male and F means female.
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Interviews
In OAX, 35 persons were interviewed: 19 males (65.5%) and
10 females (34.5%). The ethnic groups of participants are: 6
Chontales (17.1%), 8Mestizos (22.9%), 2Mixes (5.7%), 3Mixtecs
(8.6%), 5 Zapotecs (14.3%), 8 Zapotecs from Juchitán (22.9%), 3
Zoques (8.6%). The distribution of the interviewees by gender is
presented in Figure 5.
In NGHA, 29 persons were interviewed: 19 males (65.5%) and
10 females (34.5%). The ethnic groups of participants are: 1, Akan
(3.4%), 1 Asante (3.4%), 4 Bimobas (13.8%), 1 Bissa (3.4%), 1
Frafra (3.4%), 3 Fulanis (10.3%), 1 Gruni (3.4%), 4 Konkombas
(13.8%), 5 Kussasis (17.2%), and 4 Mamprusis (13.8%), 1 Mossi
(3.4%), 1 Sissala (3.4%) and 2 Waalas (6.9%). The distribution of
the interviewees by gender is shown in Figure 6.
Results
We report first the global measures of trust and cooperation
for each region: size of personal networks of cooperation, trust
levels of usual cooperators, and size of trust circles, and report
statistically significant differences between OAX and NGHA for
these measures. Given there were some differences in the types of
settlements where participants of OAX and NGHA lived (rural,
FIGURE 4 | Distribution of participants by ethnic groups in the method
of ego networks of cooperation. M means male and F means female.
FIGURE 5 | Distribution of interviewees by ethnic groups and gender. M
means male and F means female.
small urban and big urban settlements), the Supplementary
Material 5 shows an analysis to rule out that significant
differences in trust and cooperation were due to this factor.
Once shown statistically that there are significant differences
in networks of trust and cooperation between both territories,
we consider in more detail the structure and composition of
cooperation and trust networks, the levels of general trust, the
attitudes toward betrayals of trust and conflicts, and potential
influences on trust and cooperation (Supplementary Material
6 shows this information detailed in tables). We distinguish
whether the results were obtained through the ego network or
the interviews where appropriate.
Comparison of Trust and Cooperation between
OAX And NGHA
In both territories, the number of usual cooperators reported by
the participants in the interviews is not very high. The mean does
not exceed 15 people. The mean of usual cooperators is smaller
in OAX (9.36) than in NGHA (14.39) (Table 1).
The participants’ trust levels toward their networks of usual
cooperators are detailed in Table 3 by means of the mean of usual
cooperators in each trust level. There are more usual cooperators
with high trust levels in NGHA than OAX (very high: 5.09 and
3.02; high: 6.59 and 3.27 respectively). There are more usual
cooperators with middle trust level in OAX than NGHA (2.38
and 1.65 respectively) (Table 2).
Although the mean of trustees is higher than the mean of
usual cooperators, it doesn’t exceed 24 people. Again, the mean
of trustees is fewer in OAX (12.50) than in NGHA (23.67)
(Table 3).
There are significant differences –one-tailed Mann-Whitney
test– with respect to the number of usual cooperators (U = 1135,
FIGURE 6 | Distribution of interviewees by ethnic groups. M means male
and F means female.
TABLE 1 | Comparison of mean usual cooperators (ego networks).
Number of usual cooperators
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance Median
OAX 66 9.36 5.615 31.527 7.00
NGHA 46 14.39 11.008 121.177 10.50
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z = −2.27, N = 112, p < 0.03, r = −0.214) and trustees
(U = 302.5, z = −2.28, N = 61, p < 0.02, r = −0.291) between
OAX and NGHA: a higher number of people in both cases in
NGHA.
In addition, the numbers of usual cooperators that are low
or not trusted show no significant differences (U = 1514.5,
z = −0.027, N = 112, p < 0.5, r = −0.002 and U = 1404,
z = − 1.256, N = 112, p < 0.2, r = −0.118 respectively)
between both regions. But significant differences were found
between the number of cooperators with very high (U = 1191.5,
z = −1.95, N = 112, p < 0.03, r = −0.184), high (U = 1039.5,
TABLE 2 | Comparison of mean usual cooperators distributed by trust
levels (ego networks).
Group Number of cooperators by trust level
Very. High. Middle Low. No.
high.trust trust trust trust trust
OAX Mean 3.02 3.27 2.38 0.52 0.18
N 66 66 66 66 66
Std. Deviation 2.421 3.698 2.021 1.026 0.763
Variance 5.861 13.678 4.085 1.054 0.582
Median 2.50 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
NGHA Mean 5.09 6.59 1.65 0.70 0.30
N 46 46 46 46 46
Std. Deviation 4.979 8.145 3.928 1.631 0.840
‘ Variance 24.792 66.337 15.432 2.661 0.705
Median 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Mean 3.87 4.63 2.08 0.59 0.23
N 112 112 112 112 112
Std. Deviation 3.812 6.131 2.963 1.305 0.794
Variance 14.531 37.586 8.777 1.704 0.630
Median 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE 3 | Comparison of mean trustees (interviews).
Number of trustees
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance Median
OAX 34 12.50 19.288 372.015 6.00
NGHA 27 23.67 33.552 1125.769 10.00
z = −3.75, N = 112, p < 0.003, r = −0.269) and middle
(U = 902.5, z = −3.75, N = 112, p < 0.001, r = − 0.354)
trust levels: a higher level of very high and high trusted
cooperators in NGHA and middle trusted cooperators in OAX
(Table 4).
Networks of Usual Cooperators (Ego Networks)
The networks of usual cooperators are mostly composed by
relatives, friends and neighbors in both territories, but their
distribution is different in both regions. In the case of OAX
most cooperators are relatives (51.13%), and then friends and
neighbors (16.99 and 15.86% respectively). However, in the case
of NGHA, most of the usual cooperators are friends (49.24%),
followed by relatives (28.33%) and neighbors (11.67%). In both
cases, higher trust levels toward usual cooperators also seem to
go together with higher levels of reciprocity in their cooperative
exchanges.
A bias toward “ethnic endogamy” in cooperation can be found
in OAX with respect to NGHA because participants’ networks of
usual cooperators show fewer individuals of different ethnicity.
In OAX just 1 (Mixtec) out of the 7 ethnic groups analyzed had
more than the 20% of their usual cooperators of different ethnic
group. In NGHA 3 (Kussasi, Mamprusi, Frafra) out of 5 ethnic
groups had more than the 20% of their usual cooperators with
different ethnicity.
With respect to the types of cooperationmost oftenmentioned
with the networks of usual cooperators, there also are differences
between OAX and NGHA. The most mentioned in NGHA
respect to OAX are advices (30.37 and 17.65%), information
(17.76 and 5.37%) and secrets (15.23 and 11.74%). However,
OAX refers more to services (18.58 and 7.22%) and lending
objects (15.86 and 3.53%) and lending money (12.21 and 7.57%).
There also are differences in the level of reciprocity of the
cooperation between the two regions: even when the highest
percentage of cooperation among usual cooperators is reciprocal
in both territories, this percentage in OAX is higher than in
NGHA (84.20 and 74.28%). However, in NGHA there is a higher
percentage than in OAX of cases of usual cooperators with no
reciprocal cooperation, both when the participant is who receives
(13.20 and 7.59%) as the giver (12.53 and 8.20%).
Finally, family plays a greater role in OAX than in NGHA,
since for any type of cooperation the percentage of relatives as
usual cooperators is higher, except for information exchanges.
In NGHA these percentages are divided between family and
friends: more relatives than friends for lending money, secrets
and services; and more friends than relatives for information,
advices, learning and jobs.
Networks of Trustees (Interviews)
Circles of trust are mostly composed of relatives in both cases
(80.67% in OAX, and 66.22% in NGHA), with more friends
in NGHA (7.95 and 13.52%). Relatives’ social relevance is
also indicated by the proportion of good relationships with
relatives (74 and 68.97% respectively) and the proportion of
interviewees that declare to trust always the family (51.42 and
44.83% respectively). Relatives are also the preferred recipients
of secrets (71.93 and 70.82% respectively), but in NGHA
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TABLE 4 | Statistical OAX-NGHA differences in number of cooperators, trustees and trust levels of usual cooperators.
Comparison of OAX and NGHA trust (one-tailed Mann Whitney test)
Groups N. coop. N. Trustees Trust level
Very high trust High trust Middle Trust Low trust No trust
OAX/NGHA U = 1135
p < 0.03
U = 302.5
p < 0.02
U = 1191.5
p < 0.03
U = 1039.5
p < 0.003
U = 902.5
p < 0.001
U = 1514.5
p < 0.5
U = 1404
p < 0.2
N. coop, number of usual cooperators; N. Trustees, number of trustees; Trust levels respect to usual cooperators, very high, high, middle, low and not trust; p, p-value, significance
level.
we don’t find participants who declared not to tell their
secrets to anybody, while in OAX we find the 15.28% of
participants.
On the other hand, there is a higher proportion in NGHA than
in OAX of participants who declare having good relationships
with their nearest network of people: same clan (78.13%) in
NGHA; and extended family (62.22%), “compadres” (63.64%)
and community members (65.75%), in OAX. Besides, in OAX
more people declare having little relationship with these networks
than in NGHA (28.89 and 12.33% respectively). Together with
the higher proportion of interethnic cooperation, these data
suggests that in NGHA trust and cooperation extends beyond
family. As a matter of fact, family is a more encompassing
structure in NGHA. People in NGHA mention more frequently
than in OAX the meanings of lineage –“identity and origins”
(14.05 for 2.44% in OAX)–, unity of persons –“be together”
(26.57 and 3.66% respectively)–, and to a lesser extent, mutual
help (29.70 and 24.38%), as relevant dimensions of family. In
OAX, on the contrary, family involves an emotional dimension:
“something valuable” (12.19 and 9.38% respectively), “give love”
(7.32 and 1.56%), and components just mentioned in OAX:
“respect” (2.44%), “happiness” (3.66%), “pride” (1.22%). Thus,
in NGHA family extends to a greater number of individuals –a
lineage– for mutual help.
General Trust (Interviews)
In NGHA there is more interaction among ethnic groups than
in OAX: the 57.78% of participants in OAX declare not having
contact with other ethnic groups but nobody says so in NGHA.
Accordingly, more interaction in NGHA translates into a higher
proportion of answers of having good (12.35%) and bad (19.35%)
relationships with other ethnic groups than in the OAX sample
(8.89 and 11.10% respectively). However, the 17.25% of NGHA
answers doesn’t show clearly how the relationships are with other
ethnic groups.
The greater interaction among ethnic groups in NGHA than
in OAX has to do with a higher proportion of people who declare
trusting other ethnic groups in absolute terms (44.4 and 35.29%
respectively). However, the percentage of answers not trusting
other ethnic groups is also higher in NGHA respect to OAX
(22.22 and 14.71%). Themistrust is also implicit in the expression
“it depends” that has a higher proportion in OAX than in NGHA
(38.24 and 30.56%).
But a way to clearly measure general trust is the attitude
toward unknown people. Although the decision of trusting for
the first time in both countries is mostly based on the other’s
behavior (47.95% in OAX and 48% in NGHA), greater signs
of general trust are found again in NGHA. There are a higher
percentage of answers in NGHA than OAX of “trust in advance”
(18 and 2.74%) and relying on “appearance” (14 and 1.37%).
However, in OAX “references” are more needed than in NGHA
(15.07 and 12%), where many declare “not be able to trust in
advance” (21.92%) nobody says so in NGHA.
As regards newcomers, the NGHA interviewees show an
attitude more open than those from OAX. In NGHA, there
is a larger number of responses than in OAX that refer to
offering a special treatment to the newcomer (20.44% for 9.67%),
having meetings and sharing activities (17.18% for 12.89%),
communicating (12.90% for 9.68%), giving donations (16.14%
for 12.90%), sharing (2.14% for 0), and transmitting the group
values and norms (6.46% for 1.07%) with them. In the case of
OAX, however, these differences in the percentages with respect
to the above-mentioned answers are replaced by attitudes such
as “do nothing” (7.53%), the simple coexistence (4.30%) or just
know the new person (7.53%).
With respect to the activities to foster trust, in both
areas, meetings (45.26% in OAX and 43.65% in NGHA) and
shared activities (34.75% in OAX and 29.58% in NGHA) were
mentioned. Again, helping has a higher proportion of answers
in NGHA than OAX (7.04 and 2.10%), but “doing nothing”
has a higher proportion of answers in OAX than NGHA (9.47
and 4.22%). However, a difference can be found with respect
to the kinds of meetings that foster trust: festive meetings are
mentioned more frequently in OAX than NGHA (26.31 and
15.48%), and religious meetings and rituals more mentioned in
NGHA (religious meetings: 8.45% in NGHA and 5.27% in OAX;
rituals: 5.64%, just in NGHA).
Additionally, in NGHA there is a higher percentage of
affirmative answers on the influence of religion (89.65%) in the
level of cooperation than OAX (47.06%) -a factor thought to
foster general trust-. Similarly, the Government is attributed a
greater role in promoting cooperation in NGHA than in OAX
(91.67 and 51.61% respectively).
Betrayal of Trust and Conflicts (Interviews)
OAX has a lower percentage of people who forget the betrayal of
trust (20% for 51.72% in NGHA), and a greater number of people
who punish the betrayal of trust (86.35% for 52.73%).
Consistent with the centrality of mutual help, NGHA shows
a higher percentage of answers that mentioned the lack of
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help as a betrayal of trust (19.14% for 3.28% in OAX) or as a
reason to break agreements (8.51%). In OAX, on the contrary,
gossip is mentioned more frequently as a betrayal of trust
(16.40% for 4.25%). Trust betrayal has more consequences in
OAX than in NGHA, involving direct punishment (18.17% for
9.10%), and punishment by avoidance (68.18% for 43.63%).
Conversely, in NGHA ismore frequently answered not punishing
the betrayal of trust (25.46% for 4.55%), and proposing measures
of approximation (21.81% for 9.10%).
In the same sense, it is also observed more communication
(48.10% for 42.97%), less mediation (15.19% for 29.83%),
more “forgive and forget” (10.12%) and more attitudes of self-
assessment (rectify: 8.86%; understand the problem: 8.86%) as
conflict solving strategies in NGHA than in OAX. By contrast in
OAX, people mention more passive measures (8.77%) and just
“some way” of approach (11.40%).
Influences on Trust and Cooperation (Interviews)
The different economic situation in both regions, seem to play
an indirect role on trust and cooperation, through the different
sort of needs of the members of each group. Thus, in OAX only
the 10.26% of participants say they feel insecure, while in NGHA,
this percentage rises to 43.33%. Similarly, economic fears appear
in 12.73% of responses in NGHA, but none in OAX; security fears
are mentioned by 17.84% in NGHA, but just 5.12% in OAX; fear
about health appears in 12.75% of NGHA respondents, but only
in 2.57% from OAX. Security fears in NGHA are related to inter-
ethnic conflicts (differences of power, land distribution, etc.), and
thefts. In general, fears in NGHA have to do with economic
scarcity. This pressing nature of necessity in NGHA also appears
in the higher number of responses which explicitly mention the
value of mutual help (29.42%, for 5.63% in OAX) as a way to
keep trust. This connection between trust and greater necessity
is also manifested in that the economic exchanges are thought
to require high levels of trust in NGHA (22.85%, for 14.70%
in OAX).
Similarly, the different level of available resources of each
region is also reflected in the role of reputation. While the
importance of reputation is very high in both regions (97.14% in
OAX and 93.10% in NGHA), the reasons to gain reputation are
different: related to help, in NGHA; related to norm compliance,
in OAX. Here reputation comes from “being considered a
community member” (34.10% in OAX, 12.50% in NGHA); while
in NGHA, good reputation is more frequently associated than in
OAX with “a greater level of help received” (27.10% for 9.09%),
and with “being respected and trusted” (33.34% for 13.64%), as a
way to warrant future support.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study supports the hypothesis that small groups are the
basic structure around which networks of trust and cooperation
organize. Across different regions and even diverse social groups,
a common pattern can be discerned –a small-sized trust circle– as
a sort of “evolved proclivity” (Fiske, 2000) to make cooperation
possible, as our first hypothesis contends. Despite the ethnic
heterogeneity of the regions compared, a similar link between
trust and cooperation was found. Against the first prediction of
cultural group selection theory, cooperation does not take place
homogeneously across cultural groups, but is structured around
small groups of trusting people. Against the second prediction of
cultural group selection theory, trust reinforces social cohesion,
playing the role of an inertial force toward social diversity, which
goes against the assimilation process of different groups into the
most successful one. Cultural diversity does not disappear in the
long run, but it is sustained by the dynamics of cooperation,
which does not need to align with culture, as per our second
hypothesis.
Our results also support our third hypothesis that the efficacy
of the trust network is related to the environmental demands the
group faces, among other possible constraints, so that differences
are to be expected in the particular arrangement this basic social
structure will take in each case. In fact, our results suggest two
different types of trust networks corresponding to each region,
relative to environmental scarcity and the corresponding degree
of group cohesion found:
Type 1
In OAX, trust circles seem to involve less people, and cooperation
is also circumscribed to less people. In particular, high-
trust cooperators are almost exclusively relatives, which share
affection. General trust is also lower: cooperation takes place
among same group members, reluctance to actively incorporate
new group members is higher, trust betrayal is not forgotten,
and requires punishment. Efforts are notmade toward remedying
conflicts.
Type 2
By contrast, in NGHA, both personal trust networks (trustees)
and usual cooperators are bigger, with higher proportions of
highly trusted usual cooperators. Cooperation also extends to a
greater number of people, both from the same lineage and clan,
but also from other ethnic groups. General trust is higher: more
trustees among other ethnic groups, newcomers are integrated
and conflicts solved through communication and activemeasures
of approximation.
These differences can be explained by reference to the
different levels of economic and ecological scarcity: subsistence
economy and few resources in NGHA, and environmental
richness in OAX. Thus, it is observed how in NGHA, where the
environmental conditions are harder, there are social networks
of trust extended to a higher number of individuals, as a
strategy that fosters greater cooperation and hence, guarantees
greater chances of survival. Trust networks of type 2 are
particularly effective in this sense. In addition to larger trust
circles, the NGHA cooperation networks have higher levels of
trust. Besides, the circles of cooperation are extended to more
different people, thereby ensuring higher chances of survival. At
the same time, such persons in NGHA are also more willing
to increase trust circles –more active behavior to integrate new
people– and to decrease the chances of breaking bonds –greater
willingness to forget the betrayal of trust and less willingness to
punish it.
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In addition, it has also been shown that groups in NGHA
have more internalized the assistance to other group members
in their system of values –they mentioned more frequently
“help” as a necessary requirement to keep trust relationships
and as a beneficial effect of having a good reputation. This is
consistent with previous research in Ghana, which also found the
importance ofmutual help in friendship, and the awareness of the
risks incurred when trust extends beyond relatives (Adams and
Plaut, 2003; Adams, 2005; Acedo-Carmona and Gomila, 2014b).
The type of trust network found in OAX, on the other hand,
may have to do with the historical past events. In OAX, ethnic
diversity is the outcome of a history in which different groups
created their cultural identities over centuries, in spite of being in
contact along periods of conquest and/or migratory movements.
With the Spanish Colonization and Republic, the groups
strengthened their identity and social enclosure as a way to
protect their territorial rights and face the marginalization from
the established powers. This may have pushed the communities
to stay put, in spite of the syncretic transformations of their
respective cultures by the Spanish hegemony. Together with
this broad common culture, ethnic and linguistic diversity have
persisted, against the predictions of cultural group selection
theory.
Another factor contributing to keeping with group diversity
was may have to do with the orography of the area. Mountainous
separation between villages added further difficulty to intergroup
exchanges. In addition, cultural differentiation was also kept
because of the expression of the “commonality” of municipalities
as a group hallmark (Gerrero Osorio, 2013; Nava Morales, 2013)
to create association, internal organization and better defend
territory (Aquino Zacarías, 2013).
NGHA, on the other side, has a long history of different
cultural settlements regardless of national borders, with
continuous migration and trading with other groups. However,
in this case, groups have interacted more both during British
Colonization and after Independence. Conflicts among different
cultural groups settled in the same country already existed and
with the British Colonization became more intense. This also led
to the intensification of ethnic diversity to defend territories and
administrative powers, similarly as in OAX.
Taken together, the regions studied are examples of how
the unity and association into social groups, is more cohesive
when necessary to face contexts of scarcity and lack of power.
While the cultural identity of the groups studied was affected
by the colonization processes they respectively experienced, their
respective patterns of cooperation, grounded in trust networks,
provide the cement to keep them diverse –even if more open to
intergroup exchange in one case than in the other.
Even when cultural identity of the smaller ethnic groups
allowed them to create some way of “emotional” ties that drives
them to act together more frequently, trust groups are more basic
pillars of cooperation. The psychology of personal trust might
be more fostered, however, by emotional figures such as those of
lineage and clan of NGHA, more attached to values of belonging,
identity and group support than by the regulatory figures of OAX.
A further level of analysis, which we haven’t been able to carry
out given the insufficient number of participants for this goal,
would consist in comparing in more detail the different ethnic
groups within each of the studied regions. Still, some relevant
features can be discerned. Despite there aremore conflicts among
ethnic groups in NGHA than in OAX, higher levels of trust
among members of different groups are found among them than
in OAX, maybe due to the fact that inter-ethnic contact fosters
personal trust –in OAX interaction among ethnic groups is rare.
Only the Mixtecs from OAX happen to cooperate with non-
Mixtecs in a significant proportion, while in NGHA it’s more
common to cooperate with members of other ethnic groups.
In general, humans seem to become more individualistic
in more developed societies, where the economic levels allow
acquiring certain security –absence of survival concerns– because
they don’t have the same need of others for vital support.
Culturally, the expression of this is reinforcing family bonds
around the nuclear family. Not being so necessary reinforcing the
values of unity and trust, new ties arise with lower levels of trust,
which are good enough to provide the required benefits in the
short term.
In conclusion, this work supports our hypothesis that small
groups of trust and cooperation are the basic, universal, form
of sociality. This social form is modulated by the particular
environment the group is placed and the cultural strategies
developed to foster trust and cooperation beyond such a basic
social unit. Comparing the NGHA and OAX groups reveals
different strategies in this respect, which have to do with the
differences in environmental and historical conditions. The more
scarce the resources, the higher the degree of social cohesion
needed to sustain the society and the greater the push toward
keeping ethnic diversity.
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